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Introduction
When mortgage loan defaults occur, lenders bear legal, administrative and opportunity
costs that accrue in direct proportion to the total time required to resolve the default
(Clauretie, 1987). For this reason, recent research has focused on methods to expedite the
default resolution process. In general, the focus of this research is the effect of various
statutes and regulations on resolution time. For example, Clauretie (1989) ﬁnds that
private mortgage insurers (conventional loans) have higher aggregate loss rates in states
that use the judicial method of foreclosure, have right of redemption laws and
prohibitions against deﬁciency judgment liens (these terms are explained below).
Clauretie (1990) also analyzes a large number of FHA defaults and ﬁnds that losses per
default are higher in judicial foreclosure and right of redemption states. Bible (1988)
analyzes the average time for a sample of Louisiana (a judicial state) foreclosures. He
argues that judicial states, other factors being equal, are likely to be associated with a
longer average time to foreclosure.
The results of these studies imply that lender costs (losses) can be reduced by speciﬁc
legal reforms that will reduce the average time required to foreclose on a delinquent loan.
The present research contributes to the analysis of default resolution by recognizing that
borrowers face a “menu” of choices for delinquency resolution. In addition to the
standard foreclosure procedure other alternatives, such as voluntary surrender of deed to
the lender (friendly foreclosure), sale of the property prior to foreclosure, and ﬁling
bankruptcy are available. Our approach presumes that these choices will be inﬂuenced by
the legal environment and that the mix of statutes available in a given state will effect the
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Abstract. In addition to standard foreclosure, three other methods of resolution for
mortgage defaults are available: bankruptcy protection, surrender of deed to the lender, and
pre-foreclosure sale. This paper develops a model that speciﬁes the choice of resolution
method as a function of the state-speciﬁc legal environment and local area economic
conditions. A large national data set is used to estimate a multinomial logit choice model
for the 1987 to 1991 period. The results indicate that the choice of default resolution
alternative is sensitive to the legal environment. The results imply that selected legal
reforms will tend to improve the efﬁciency of the default resolution process.resolution choice. We employ a large national data set to generate multinomial logit
estimates of the effects of the legal environment on the default resolution choice. The
results indicate that the non-foreclosure resolution choices, which are generally more
efﬁcient, will tend to be promoted by elimination of redemption and deﬁciency
prohibition statutes. Because these outcomes usually involve cooperation among lenders
and borrowers, the results imply that speciﬁc steps to encourage such outcomes will tend
to reduce default losses. In addition, the results allow inference on the legal environment
that is most conducive to reduced default resolution time. The paper is organized as
follows: section one details the empirical model; section two presents a description of the
data used in the analysis; section three summarizes the results.
The Model
The foreclosure and liquidation of residential properties is initiated by the decision of
borrowers to default. A large literature has analyzed the determinants of both the
probability and timing of defaults.1 However, as noted, given that default occurs, the
borrower and lender face additional choices regarding the resolution of the defaulted
loan. In addition to standard judicial or power of sale foreclosures (FORECLOSE),
defaults may also be resolved by: ﬁling of bankruptcy protection (BANKRUPT),
surrender of deed to the lender (DEED), and sale of the property prior to foreclosure
(PRESALE). Two of the choices are unilateral by the borrower: BANKRUPT and
FORECLOSE. While foreclosure is technically initiated by the lender, the borrower’s
choice not to seek other methods of resolution initiates the process. The remaining two
choices are bilateral in that they indicate cooperation among the parties to resolve the
delinquency. Note, however, that the borrower makes the choice to pursue these options
by initiating contact with the lender.
The BANKRUPT choice is a delaying action: it does not resolve the default. It is treated
as a resolution alternative in our model due to the extended delays associated with the
bankruptcy process. Because of these delays, the BANKRUPT choice imposes additional
costs on the lender. These costs include losses on the nonperforming loan as well as
administrative and legal expenses. Since these costs are borne exclusively by the lender,
they are not relevant for the borrower. However the BANKRUPT choice is not costless for
the borrower: costs include legal fees, reduced access to credit and intangible costs such as
damage to personal reputation. The BANKRUPT choice is selected when the beneﬁts to
the borrower (relative to all other choices) exceed the costs associated with bankruptcy.2
With the DEED choice, title to the property is voluntarily surrendered to the lender
(also known as “friendly” foreclosure). In the usual case, the borrower will be subject to
deﬁciency claims because the loan balance plus costs borne by the lender is likely to
exceed the sale proceeds. However the lender often writes off the deﬁciency in exchange
for a relatively small fee. The advantage for the lender is reduced losses due to a reduced
resolution time. The beneﬁt for the borrower is a reduction in the costs of default: the
credit history will not show a foreclosure.
PRESALE indicates a resolution of the delinquency by sale of the property prior to
foreclosure. The PRESALE choice involves cooperation between the borrower and
lender to expedite sale of the property. In many cases, borrowers in default having a
positive equity position will unilaterally initiate sale on their own prior to contact with
the lender. This situation is precluded in our analysis since the PRESALE cases included
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lender’s losses are minimized but not eliminated.
The choice of resolution method is modeled in a utility maximizing framework: we
assume that the chosen resolution alternative is that one that maximizes borrower utility.
The probability of resolution of the delinquent mortgage for each choice is given by:
PROB (CHOICEi,t = j) = exp (bjXi,t) / SbjXi,t , (1)
where PROB (CHOICEi,t = j) is the probability that individual i will select choice j
(j = 1–4; 1 = FORECLOSE, 2 = BANKRUPT, 3 = PRESALE, and 4 = DEED) and 
bj is the estimated effect of X on this probability. X is given by:
X = F(CURRENTLTV, JUDICIAL, APPREC, REDEMPTIME,
DEFICIENCY, BALANCE, PERCAPINC, FLORIDA,
TEXAS, TIME) , (2)
where:
CURRENTLTV = the estimated current loan balance to house value ratio;
JUDICIAL = a binary variable that equals 1 if the default occurred in
a judicial foreclosure state and 0 if it occurred in a power
of sale state;
APPREC = the annualized average rate of appreciation from default
until the date of the title transfer;
REDEMPTIME = the statutory redemption period in months (REDEMP-
TIME equals 0 if the state does not have a redemption
statutes);
DEFICIENCY = a binary variable that equals 1 if the default occurred in
a state allowing deﬁciency judgments and 0 otherwise;
BALANCE = the unpaid mortgage loan balance ($000s);
PERCAPINC = per capita income in the quarter of the default;
FLORIDA = a binary variable indicating defaults that occurred in
Florida and 0 otherwise;
TEXAS = a binary variable indicating defaults that occurred in
Texas and 0 otherwise;
TIME = the number of days in delinquency, where delinquency is
deﬁned as the time from default until resolution.
The model is overidentiﬁed and estimation requires that restrictions be imposed on the
parameters bj, which measure the effect on the elements of Xi,t on the jth choice. The
estimation procedure restricts bj equals 4 to equal 1, and the other b parameters provide
relative measures. Because of this restriction, the parameter estimates are not easily
interpreted.2 However, derivatives of the probability of each choice with respect to the
elements of X are readily calculated as follows:
d (PROB CHOICEit = j) / dXi = (PROB CHOICEit = j) * (bj2Z) , (3)
where:
Z = (PROB CHOICEit = 1) *b + (PROB CHOICEit = 2) b+
(PROB CHOICEit = 3) *b.
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CURRENTLTV raises the likelihood of cooperative resolution (DEED or PRESALE).
As CURRENTLTV is higher, the ratio of the loan balance to market value is larger.
There is a greater incentive for both parties to cooperate to reduce losses. Because of the
incentives to cooperate, there is a reduced likelihood of resolution by BANKRUPT or
FORECLOSE. JUDICIAL indicates states that use the judicial method of foreclosure. In
the judicial foreclosure method, the lender must initiate a costly court action to acquire
title to the property. The alternative is the power of sale method which expedites the
process because a trustee may initiate foreclosure without a court order. Because
JUDICIAL states are associated with a longer resolution time there is an increased
likelihood of resolution by standard foreclosure (FORECLOSE). JUDICIAL is predicted
to negatively effect the probability of the BANKRUPT choice because of the increased
incentive to ﬁle bankruptcy in power of sale states. Due to the shorter duration of the
foreclosure process in such states, gains from costless shelter are increased with the
BANKRUPT choice. JUDICIAL is also predicted to lower the probability of the
cooperative choices. Because power of sale states hasten the foreclosure process and
impose higher costs on defaulters, there is a higher probability of resolution by
PRESALE  and  DEED.
Higher APPREC values indicate a stronger regional housing market. Such markets
are generally associated with a reduction in market time and a higher contract to ask
price ratio. The relative ease of liquidation raises the costs of the unilateral choices
(BANKRUPT and FORECLOSE) and lowers the probability that they will be chosen.
Both parties are predicted to beneﬁt from a cooperative resolution. With resolution by
PRESALE, lender losses are reduced due to the expected higher percentage of principal
recovered. Because deﬁciencies are lower, lenders are more inclined toward discharge
which clearly beneﬁts borrowers.
REDEMPTION indicates delinquencies that occur in states having redemption
statutes. These laws provide the option to recover a foreclosed property for some period
after the fact by payment of principal balance and all costs. From the lenders’ perspective
redemption rights are equivalent to a conditional lien which raises liquidation costs
because marketing is more difﬁcult.3 Thus longer REDEMPTION periods impose
additional costs on lenders which increases the incentive for a cooperative resolution.
With resolution by PRESALE or DEED, redemption rights are suspended.
DEFICIENCY identiﬁes defaults that occur in states having laws that permit judgment
liens to satisfy foreclosure sale deﬁciencies. Because lenders have the right to recover all
administrative, legal, marketing, and other costs, there is an incentive for the borrower to
cooperate with the lender. Thus there is a greater likelihood of resolution by PRESALE
or DEED. However states having deﬁciency provisions are predicted to increase the
probability that the borrower will seek bankruptcy protection. This is because
bankruptcy settlements usually result in the discharge of deﬁciencies. In effect, the
discharge feature of the bankruptcy code has the effect of nullifying deﬁciency recovery
provisions.
The variable BALANCE indicates the amount of the unpaid principal balance. A
larger BALANCE increases the incentive for lenders to seek a cooperative resolution
because of the increased losses on the nonperforming loan. PERCAPINC proxies for the
overall economic strength of the region and the unknown income of the borrower at the
time of default. Higher PERCAPINC values correlate with increased housing demand
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VOLUME 13, NUMBER 2, 1997and the likelihood of the PRESALE choice is higher. In addition, insofar as
PERCAPINC proxies for individual earnings, the probability of BANKRUPT is
predicted to be lower. The rationale is that a stronger economy and increased individual
earning potential raises the costs of bankruptcy, which may include reduced employment
opportunities. FLORIDA and TEXAS are included in the model to control for housing
market conditions that were speciﬁc to these states. The economic conditions and the
magnitude of defaults in these states increases the likelihood of resolution by
BANKRUPT and  FORECLOSE relative to the entire sample.
TIME is included in the model to control for the effect of the length of time since
default: a longer TIME increases the likelihood of resolution by standard foreclosure
(FORECLOSE). Exhibit 1 lists the predicted relationship for each of the variables
included in the model.
The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The primary sources of data are the servicing and foreclosure tracking systems of a large
national lender. During the period analyzed, this institution serviced more than 100,000
residential and commercial mortgage loans distributed over the entire U.S. The data
analyzed are the subset of defaulted (residential only) loans recorded by the tracking
system. Included are a total of 2,612 defaults that occurred between August 1987 and
December 1991. For all observations, the data contain detailed information on the
location of the property, the original purchase price, the contract mortgage interest rate,
the principal balance at default, the month of default, and the date of default resolution.
The default month is deﬁned as the ﬁrst month that the full principal and interest
payment is not received. TIME is the number of days from the beginning of the default
month until resolution by FORECLOSE, DEED or PRESALE.4
Exhibit 2 presents descriptive information on the data and the geographic distribution
of sample observations. Possibly reﬂecting the effect of adverse regional economic
conditions for the period analyzed, Florida, Texas and Colorado have the largest number
of defaults. The states are listed in descending order of average TIME values. Note that
JUDICIAL states tend to have longer average TIME values.
Supplemental data were used to construct other variables used in the empirical
analysis. APPREC, the estimate of housing appreciation during the default period, is
computed using the Fannie Mae–Freddie Mac repeat sales index which is computed for
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Exhibit 1
Predicted Effects
BANK PRESALE DEED FORECLOSE
CURRENTLTV – + + –
JUDICIAL – – – +
APPREC – + + –
REDEMPTION – + + ?
DEFICIENCY + + + –
BALANCE + + + –
PERCAPINC – + + –each state (Li, 1995). APPREC is the percentage change in the index for the relevant state
from default until transfer of the title.
Exhibit 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the model and
other variables of interest. The 2,612 observations were nearly equally divided among
JUDICIAL (52%) and power of sale states (48%) states. Only 13% of the sample
observations were not resolved by FORECLOSE: DEED (3%) and PRESALE (10%). A
small percentage of the states in the sample (16%) have REDEMPTION statutes. Almost
all of the states (94%) have DEFICIENCY provisions.
Exhibit 3 indicates that the average length of time from origination until default was
four years and four months: the average TIME value was 342. The average original
property value at origination was $91,781 and the average original mortgage loan
amount was $78,767, so that the average sample loan-to-value ratio was .88.
Exhibit 4 presents the means for the same variables by the type of resolution. Exhibit
4 indicates that 218 (8%) of defaults involve the BANKRUPT choice, 82 (3%) are resolved
by the DEED choice, and 271 (10%) are resolved via PRESALE. For defaults
accompanied by BANKRUPT ﬁlings, the average TIME value increased to 524 days, a
58% increase over the average TIME for all defaults (342 days). DEED and PRESALE
resolutions are associated with lower TIME values on average at 235 and 234 days,
respectively. The mean TIME value for judicial states is 386 days and 295 days for power
of sale states.
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Exhibit 2
Summary Statistics by State
No. of Foreclose
State Observs TIME PRESALE DEFICIENCY REDEMPTION Method
New Jersey 25 506 3 no no Judicial
Pennsylvania 17 497 7 yes no Judicial
New Mexico 29 422 18 yes yes Judicial
Minnesota 11 415 2 yes yes Power of sale
Washington 44 405 18 yes yes Judicial
Florida 844 400 313 yes no Judicial
Virginia 29 391 11 yes no Power of sale
California 48 376 16 no no Power of sale
Nevada 38 373 24 yes no Power of sale
Oregon 19 370 9 yes no Power of sale
Utah 40 363 19 yes yes Judicial
Georgia 135 359 50 yes no Power of sale
N. Carolina 10 347 4 no no Power of sale
S. Carolina 40 339 12 yes no Judicial
Tennessee 31 338 11 no no Power of sale
Arizona 115 334 56 yes no Judicial
Alaska 20 325 13 no no Power of sale
Oklahoma 165 317 69 yes no Judicial
Idaho 14 302 10 yes no Power of sale
Colorado 295 275 104 yes yes Power of sale













Origination to Default (months) 56 18
TIME 342 145
Loan Amount 78,762 50,751
Purchase Price 91,781 66,973
Original Loan Amount
to House Value Ratio 87.9 11.9
BALANCE 80,530 51,549
Contract Interest Rate 10.7 1.5
Monthly Payment 765 492
Exhibit 4
Means by Resolution Method
Power
All JUDICIAL of Sale BANKRUPT DEED PRESALE
N 2612 1348 1264 218 82 271
JUDICIAL .52 .39 .68 .48
Power of Sale .48 .61 .32 .52
BANKRUPT .08 .06 .10 .03
DEED .03 .04 .02
PRESALE .10 .10 .11 .03
FLORIDA .32 .63 .19 .50 .28
TEXAS .23 .48 .25 .02 .15
REDEMPTION .16 .23 .09 N/A N/A N/A
DEFICIENCY .94 .97 .91 N/A N/A N/A
Orig. to Default (Months) 56 56 55 50 58 61
TIME 342 386 295 524 235 234
Loan Amount 78,762 68,274 89,946 95,957 77,635 90,056
Purchase Price 91,781 79,373 105,013 114,857 89,630 101,802
Original Loan
to Value Ratio 85.8 86.0 85.7 83.5 86.6 88.5
BALANCE 80,530 69,881 91,889 97,267 79,870 92,793
Contract Interest Rate 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.6 10.6 10.7
Monthly Payment 765 656 880 920 752 883Results
Exhibit 5 presents the results of the logit derivative estimates. The derivative estimates
and t-statistics are reported for each value of CHOICE. As detailed in Exhibit 5, the
derivative estimates generally have the predicted signs and almost all are highly
signiﬁcant.
The results indicate that CURRENTLTV has a large impact on CHOICE. As
CURRENTLTV increases there is, other factors being constant, a greater likelihood of
the PRESALE outcome and lower probabilities of FORECLOSE and BANKRUPT.
This result corresponds to expectations: as anticipated losses for the lender increase
(costs to the borrower), there is a greater incentive to resolve the default in a cooperative
fashion. JUDICIAL states are associated with a reduced likelihood of BANKRUPT and
PRESALE choices and are more likely to be resolved via the FORECLOSE option. This
is probably due to the increased time associated with judicial foreclosures which reduces
the incentive for borrowers to ﬁle bankruptcy. Alternatively, in power of sale states, which
are associated with a shorter foreclosure time period, there is an increased likelihood that
the borrower will ﬁle bankruptcy. JUDICIAL states reduce the likelihood of a
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Exhibit 5
Multinomial Logit Derivative Estimates
BANK PRESALE DEED FORECLOSE
Constant .043** –.660** –.080** .697**
(6.12) (–6.33) (–3.87) (10.09)
CURRENTLTV –.075** .178** .016 –.118**
(–6.22) (6.34) (1.73) (–8.47)
JUDICIAL –.049** –.028** .001 .076**
(–6.23) (–6.24) (.266) (9.68)
APPREC –.001** .004** –.001* –.004**
(–6.04) (6.31) (–1.85) (–8.65)
REDEMPTION –.034** .011** .003 .020**
(–6.22) (6.47) (1.27) (9.21)
DEFICIENCY .060** .098** .016** .174**
(6.23) (6.30) (3.04) (–10.37)
BALANCE .000** .003** .000** –.001**
(6.25) (6.32) (3.09) (–10.30)
PERCAPINC –.000** .000** –.000 _.000**
(–6.22) (6.34) (–1.07) (–4.30)
FLORIDA –.036** –.002** –.008 .030**
(–6.21) (–3.72) (–1.60) (6.36)
TEXAS –.035** –0.82** –.052** .169**
(–6.24) (–6.31) (–5.66) (10.33)
TIME –.001** .002** .000* .001**
(–6.22) (6.36) (2.15) (–7.67)
Chi-square = 263 (d.f. = 30).
*signiﬁcant at 5%; **signiﬁcant at 1%
(. . .) t-statisticcooperative resolution: there is a reduced probability of PRESALE, perhaps because
borrowers are less inclined to negotiate, and there is no effect on the likelihood of DEED
surrender.
The results indicate that APPREC has the expected effects on choice: the probability
of  BANKRUPT and  FORECLOSE is reduced and PRESALE is increased. Note
however, that the magnitude of the effects is very small. REDEMPTION time has a
negative effect on the BANKRUPT choice: a longer redemption time period increases the
value of the option to redeem and reduces the gains associated with ﬁling bankruptcy
(which voids the redemption option). The probability of resolution by PRESALE is,
however, increased: lenders have a greater incentive to negotiate and assist in a
PRESALE in order to avoid the problems that redemption rights create with respect to
foreclosure sales. As expected, longer REDEMPTION periods increase the likelihood of
the normal FORECLOSE procedure because borrowers still retain the option to reclaim
the property after the foreclosure sale. This implies that borrowers value the option even
though it is seldom exercised.
The results indicate that DEFICIENCY states increase the likelihood of all resolution
choices. The effect of DEFICIENCY on BANKRUPT, PRESALE and DEED is as
predicted: there are gains for one or both parties with each of these resolution choices.
The value of the BANKRUPT choice is increased in DEFICIENCY states because
deﬁciencies are usually discharged and borrower liability is reduced. Alternatively, there
is a greater likelihood of the cooperative choices because, given that bankruptcy is not
ﬁled, borrower liability is reduced by agreement with the lender.
PERCAPINC has the predicted effect and is statistically signiﬁcant but the effects are
very small. PERCAPINC lowers the probability of the BANKRUPT and FORECLOSE
choices. Recall that these are the only outcomes having adverse effects on an individual’s
credit history. In a strong regional economy the costs of BANKRUPT and FORECLOSE
may be higher due to the possible adverse impact on employment and investment
opportunities.
Conclusion
Previous research has implied that the efﬁciency of the foreclosure process may be
improved with speciﬁc legal reforms: First, the implementation of power of sale
provisions in all states will reduce resolution time in judicial foreclosure states. Secondly,
all states should allow deﬁciency judgments to be pursued for losses in excess of
foreclosure sale recoveries. Third, statutory redemption laws should be repealed. The
logit results reported here clarify that such reforms will tend to produce efﬁciency gains.
In addition, the results clarify that the gains derive from the effect of the legal
environment on default resolution choices by altering the relative costs and beneﬁts. For
example, the results imply that efﬁciency gains are likely when redemption statutes are
eliminated because fewer delinquencies will involve the BANKRUPT and FORECLOSE
outcomes: the beneﬁts of these choices are reduced. Likewise, DEFICIENCY provisions,
according to our results, will increase the beneﬁts (to borrowers) of the DEED or
PRESALE choice and raise the likelihood that they will be chosen. However, our
ﬁndings also imply that the efﬁciency gains from certain of the policy actions may be less
than anticipated due to the changes in the behavior of borrowers. For example, the results
suggest that borrowers may respond to the implementation of power of sale foreclosure
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND DEFAULT RESOLUTION 153procedures (intended to reduce TIME) by ﬁling bankruptcy. Power of sale provisions
increase the beneﬁts of ﬁling bankruptcy and increase the likelihood that it will occur.
Thus in some cases policies intended to reduce delinquency time may not produce the
expected efﬁciency gains.
Notes
1See, for example, Epperson et al. (1985), Springer and Waller (1993).
2There are two beneﬁts to the borrower for the BANKRUPT choice. First, the borrower may
beneﬁt from costless shelter service until eviction. Secondly, deﬁciencies (borrower liability for the
deﬁciency of sale proceeds relative to outstanding liabilities) are frequently discharged by the court.
3For details of this procedure, see Green (1993).
4Clauretie (1989) ﬁnds that lender losses are higher in states having right of redemption laws which
suggests a longer time in delinquency.
5“Workouts,” deﬁned as defaulted loans that were subsequently brought up to date or restructured
by the lender, were censured from the database.
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